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Abstract 
This paper examines African Liberation and its continued relevance to Nigeria’s foreign policy. It 
reveals that the total, cultural, social, economic and political liberation of Africa is one of the 
fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy since her independence in 1960 till date. In 
upholding the foregoing foreign policy objective, Nigeria committed moral, material and financial 
assistance to various liberation movements in some African countries still under any form of 
colonization or foreign domination. Nigeria was also the brains behind the formations of OAU in 
1963 and ECOWAS in 1975 which also served as veritable platforms for Nigeria to further struggle 
for the liberation of these countries, such as Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe etc. This sacrifice and 
commitment made by the Nigerian government resulted to liberate them from their former 
colonies. Equally, Nigeria also gave financial and technical support to these newly independent 
(liberated) African countries to take-off. It concludes that Nigeria has played and will continue to 
play the role of a big brother in the African continent. 
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Introduction 
In the words of Bukarambe (2000:117-119), Nigeria’s policy towards African liberation revolved 
around four related strategies. The first is the pursuit of direct ties with the liberation movements 
recognized by the Organization of African Union (OAU) Liberation Committee. The OAU 
conditionally served the purpose of keeping Nigeria’s policies in line with agreed African 
positions, while the direct ties facilitated the channelling of additional resources to the liberation 
movements. In April, 1976, the South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) became the 
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first liberation movement to be permitted to open offices in Nigeria. Therefore, the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa followed. The 
presence of the representatives of the various movements enabled easier co-ordination of direct 
assistance which usually involved scholarships; relief materials for those displaced living in refuge 
camps in the neighbouring countries; support items for the guerilla cadre; and generally financial 
support for their worldwide operations. 
The second strategy involved the mobilization of the Nigerian public in support of the whole 
doctrine of African Liberation which by extension, also spills over to the concept of African unity. 
Given that apartheid and the organized racism that defined settler colonialism was an emotional 
issue with all Africans, successive Nigerian governments habitually employed rhetorics that cut a 
chord with the general public. Such strategies of rousing public sentiments also served the 
additional purpose of popularizing the government of the day. To this end, the 1970s saw the 
establishment of the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) and the Southern Africa 
Relief Fund (SARF) at the behest of the federal government. Principally, NACAP was intended to 
be the instrument for mobilizing and sustaining public attention, while SARF aimed at drawing 
direct individual participation by raising voluntary financial and material donations. The processes 
were then disbursed to the various liberation movements and the affected civilian population living 
outside their respective countries. Scholarships were also awarded. 
Nigeria’s third strategy was to engage the foreign powers (usually Western) that were seen as the 
allies and protectors of the white minority government. There were points of specific reference: 
Britain was held responsible for Zimbabwa (Rhodesia); Portugal was responsible for Angola, 
Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and all the major Western powers combined (eg, United States, 
Britain, France, Germany) for the persistent defiance of the white minority requires. 
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And there were genuine complications as well; these same powers were also Nigeria’s main 
trading partners and creditors such that confronting them over anti-colonialism involved the risks 
of damaging or else threatening hard national political and economic interests. Furthermore, there 
was the reality of the Cold War and the East-West rivalry which routinely clouded the judgment 
of these countries. Still, Nigeria tried to assert itself even within these constraints. There were 
symbolic high points such as defying the United States to recognize MPLA government in Angola 
in November, 1975, and the nationalization of British Petroleum (BP) in 1977. And then there was 
the persistent stream of harsh rhetoric denouncing these powers at every turn and forum. Finally, 
Nigeria’s fourth approach was the grant of instant material support for the newly emerging 
government as they grappled with their circumstances. 
A Nation’s level of involvement in various international issues is often the expression of its general 
orientation towards the rest of the world. By orientation here, we mean a nation’s general attitudes 
and commitments towards the external environment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing 
its domestic and external objectives or interests and aspirations. A nation’s general strategy results 
from a series of cumulative decisions made in an effort to adjust objectives, values and interests to 
some conditions and characteristics of the domestic and external environments. Accordingly, the 
foreign policy of a nation-state has to do with the preservation of its independence and security, 
and secondly, with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests. Foreign policy is the aspect 
of a national policy that pertains to the external environment, and involves the enunciation of 
principles and equally indicates a country’s position on major international issues-that is to say 




Foreign policy has been conceptualized differently by different scholars. According to Abagen and 
Tyona (2019:66), foreign policy is the promotion and protection of a country’s national interest in 
the international arena. Equally, W. Wallace sees foreign policy as a high diplomacy, as concerned 
primarily with other states, with international stability and the rules of the international system, 
and with the promotion of the national interest through the cultivation of good relations with other 
governments and the negotiation and maintenance of international agreements (cited in Abia, 
2000). 
There are wide ranges of foreign policy objectives pursued by the Nigerian government in respect 
to geographic area. According to Section 19 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, states that: 
The State (Nigeria) shall promote African unity, as well as total political, 
economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of 
international cooperation conducive of the consolidation of universal peace 
and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall 
combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations. 
Therefore, this paper examines African liberation and its continued relevance to Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. In doing this, the paper is divided into three sections, the introduction which is currently 
running, Nigeria’s foreign policy and African liberation, and draws a conclusion. 
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and African Liberation  
Nigeria, at the attainment of her independence in 1960, spelt her foreign policy towards her African 
neighbours in four principles viz: 
a) The principle of Sovereign equality of all African States. 




c) The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other African States. 
d) The principle of commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity 
(Mbachu, 2011:1996). 
Balewa’s commitment towards the emancipation of all African territories under foreign 
domination, and the eradication of racial discrimination, came as an additional principle of 
Nigeria’s policy towards Africa. The nation’s commitment to this principle has varied according 
to regimes. All the same, it has come to the observation of critics that successive Nigerian 
governments have abided by the above principles strongly. Again, Balewa’s role as a brother’s 
keeper in African matters manifested shortly after independence. It became the most overt conflict 
between Nigeria and a Western power, when France persisted in testing atomic weapons in the 
Algerian Sahara. After several warnings, the Balewa government suddenly severed diplomatic 
relations with Paris on January 5, 1961. Nigeria imposed a complete embargo on all French goods 
and gave the French Ambassador forty-eight hours to leave Lagos (Mbachu, 2011:96-97). 
Nigeria came of age when the internal chaos of the former Belgian Congo was ripest. In his 1960 
foreign policy address, Prime Minister Balewa declared his knowledge of the fact that Africa was 
changing every day. His address further asserts: 
The good developments thrive with the bad ones, and that Africa was 
troubled by the signs of the ideological war between the great powers of the 
world creeping into Africa. Among other things, he stated: we shall 
persuade the African leaders to take serious note of this distressing trend… 
so that we may all find a way to unite our efforts in preventing Africans 
from becoming an area of crisis and world tensions (Mbachu, 2011:97). 
Nigeria’s activities in African international relations generally was geared towards the promotion 
of African unity and solidarity, the strength of commitment to the elimination of colonialism and 
racism in Africa, and the fostering of economic cooperation (Aluko, 1981:24). Therefore, as stated 
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by Abagen and Tyona (2018:283), Nigeria’s commitment to further promote the central tenets of 
her foreign policy objectives was in the forefront of the establishment of a continental body and a 
regional body that is, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed in May, 1963 and was 
transformed in 2003 to become the African Unity (AU) as well as the formation of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. 
Importantly, under the Balewa government, Nigeria had already been concerned with African 
unity, she did seemingly been content if her stand was supported by a majority of OAU member 
states, especially by those belonging to the former Monrovia group. Sometimes indeed it would 
appear that she was unperturbed to find herself opposed even by a majority of OAU members. For 
example, Nigeria was almost alone in opposing the exclusion of Moise Tshombe, the then 
Congolese Prime Minister from the OAU summit in Cairo in 1964. On a number of further 
occasions in 1964-1965, she continued to support the Tshombe government, even going so far as 
to defend the American-Belgian rescue operation in the Congo (Zaire) when this was attacked by 
twenty-two Afro-Asia countries in the Security Council of the United Nations. Nigeria has begun 
to play a much more vigorous part in the task of eliminating colonialism and racism on the African 
continent. Under the Balewa government this part was largely limited to a modest contribution to 
the Special Fund of the OAU Liberation Committee and to giving moral support to Liberation 
Movements. But, since late 1968, when the involvement of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia 
on the side of the Biafrans became evident, Nigeria has been advocating and increase in the 
contributions made by all African States to the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee. In 
February, 1969, the Nigerian spokesman at the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa said that, his 
government was ready to grant ‘additional funds’ to the Liberation Movements, apart from its 
regular contribution (Aluko, 1981:24-26). 
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In June, 1971, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, severely criticized the budget of 
about £1 million approved for the Liberation Committee for its work during 1971-1972. He 
described it as ‘a pathetically paltry budget… which would cover not more than a day’s 
expenditure for a moderate army. It seems reasonable to suggest that it was this type of appeal, 
backed by the OAU secretariat and the enthusiasm of King Hassan of Morocco who promised to 
make a personal contribution of $1 million, that made the Rabat summit decide to increase by fifty 
percent members’ contributions to the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee. Apart from her 
contributions to the Special Fund, which before the Rabat increases amounted to about £84,000 a 
year and later became ‘some £126,000, Nigeria has since 1968 (according to Dr Arikpo) been 
providing direct bilateral assistance to freedom fighters, supplying trucks and other types of 
military hardware, medical supplies, clothing and food. Leaders of freedom movements have been 
invited to visit Nigeria, among them, Amiicar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC (African Party for 
the Independence of Guinea-Bissau), Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress of South 
Africa, and the Reverend Abel Muzorewa of the  African National Council of  Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). Another feature of Nigeria’s intensified concern to speed up the total de-colonization 
of Africa has been the promotion of regional defence pacts. These are linked to the proposal for 
what Dr Arikpo called ‘an African task force’ which would help to defend African countries in the 
front line of colonialist or racist offenses, as well as assisting in the liberation struggle. The idea 
of a regional defence pact was strongly supported by the OAU Defence Committee (under Nigerian 
Chairmanship from 1970-1971) and by the secretariat in Addis Ababa. Other Nigerian initiatives 
included the proposal that the OAU should give specific African countries the responsibility for 
liberating particular colonial territories, and General Gowon’s demand in June 1971 that within 
the next three years, one colonial territory should be liberated by the OAU (Aluko, 1981:26-27). 
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The origin of foreign policy radicalism can be located in the open declaration by General Murtala 
Muhammed that Nigeria would henceforth make Africa the cornerstone of its external relations, a 
rhetoric that was immediately backed up by the spirit recognition of the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) faction in the Angolan struggle for self-determination. This 
unilateral action, in violation of previously agreed OAU position, was in response to intelligence 
reports that apartheid South African troops were already deep inside Angola fighting on the side 
of Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). One of the three guerrilla factions 
engaged in the struggle for control of the newly independent country. The Muhammed 
government’s swift action received widespread endorsement from Nigerians who saw their 
country beginning to take the lead as they had expected it to be doing since independence. General 
Muhammed exuded the confidence of a sure-footed leader who had mastery of the intricate politics 
of African affairs and was willing to do whatever it would taker to make Nigeria the continental 
primus inter pares that its nationals had always dreamt of long before their country gained 
independence (Fawole, 2003:90-91). 
The General Murtala Muhammed regime’s policy thrusts were also aided by the booming oil-
based economy that it inherited from its predecessor. Nigeria was already, by the mid-1970s, 
Africa’s richest country and Africa’s most prominent member of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), a major crude oil supplier to the United States, and a country with 
enough liquidity not only to refuse external aid, but at the same time dole out largess to other less-
endowed African countries. As of 1975 when the Muhammed regime came into power, Nigeria’s 
overall standing in Africa was quite impressive. It had 17.5 percent of Africa’s total population, 
and 22 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s, with the implication that one in every four black African 
was a Nigerian. Economically, it had 16.3 percent of Africa’s total GNP and 23.6 percent of Sub-
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Saharan Africa’s. Added to this demographic superiority and a booming economy was a large 
standing Army of 270,000 men, which constituted 66.9 percent of the entire Armed Forces of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Its annual defence expenditure of $977 million in 1975 was 42.7 percent of the 
total defence appropriations for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. This curious combination of 
vital statistics and the occurrence of significant African issues of the era made 
Muhammed/Obasanjo tenure a period of intense and activist foreign policy pursuits (Fawole, 
2003:92-93). 
Fawole further stressed that the opportunity to act on the Zimbabwean struggle came in the mid-
1970s when the OAU sough to bring together the two principal liberation movements, that is, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union  (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) 
as the Patriotic Front alliance to co-ordinate their resistance to white minority rule. Prior to this 
rather novel OAU initiative, Nigeria had always favoured the formation of coalitions, especially 
in multi-ethnic societies, as a sure way to prevent a situation whereby certain sections would have 
and use power to the exclusion of others and thus engender domestic rancor and instability. But 
Nigeria’s favourable disposition towards a coordinated approach came for reappraisal when the 
white minority regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally decided to select a few local leaders 
(especially Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Chief Jeremiah Chirau) and 
sought to transfer ‘power’ to them in a dubious internal settlement that excluded the major 
nationalist groups. Nigeria had no choice but to set up its support for the ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic 
Front, whose guerrillas were intensifying the war of liberation. It should be remarkable that there 
was evidence of Britain’s complicity in this dubious arrangement which not have given 
independence to the people. 
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Since Nigeria had done everything to persuade Britain of the unacceptability of the internal 
settlement to no avail, the Obasanjo regime took the most dramatic step of nationalizing the assets 
of British Petroleum (BP) company in Nigeria. Announced on July 31, 1979, the eve of the 
commonwealth summit scheduled for Lusaka, Zambia, the action had intended dramatic effect of 
arm twisting the British government of Margaret Thatcher from recognizing the dubious internal 
political settlement that excluded the main guerrilla factions that had engaged in the liberation war 
since the 1960s. The import of the nationalization inhered in the fact that BP was at the time the 
largest British investment in Nigeria and possibly the whole of Africa. And coming on the heels 
of the previous nationalization of British-owned Barclays Bank and Standard Bank, and deliberate 
discrimination against British firms in the award of government contracts, the British were 
unmistakably put on notice that Nigeria was willing to employ economic measures to achieve its 
objectives of African liberation and eradication of racism. There was also no doubt that the timing 
was deliberately chosen for good effect. And the British government got the message loud and 
clear that its plans to recognize the illegal internal settlement in Zimbabwe would be resisted by 
all means (Fawole, 2003:107-108). Thus, the Obasanjo economic action on the British hastened 
the Lancaster Conference that ushered in true independence for Zimbabwe in 1980. 
From all manifested indications, Africa was the centre-piece of Shagari’s Nigeria foreign policy 
and received priority attention. While speaking at a dinner at the Nigerian Institutes of International 
Affairs in 1982, the first Executive President of Nigeria, Shehu Shagari articulated what he called 
our principal objectives in dealing with fellow African States: 
(a) The strengthening of African solidarity through continental and regional 
organizations and institutions like the OAU, ECOWAS, and the ADB. (b) 
The promotion of peace and stability on the African continent and security 
in our sub-region, by re-emphasizing our commitment to the principles of 
respect for the provisions of the OAU Charter, especially those relating to 
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the inviolability of inherited frontiers, sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity of all countries, and peaceful accommodation and settlement of all 
disputes without foreign interference; (c) To support the rights of people to 
self determination and freedom from colonial and foreign subjugation and 
for all authentic national liberation movements in their struggle for 
independence, and (d) To give unalloyed support for all efforts to destroy 
the obnoxious apartheid system, racial bigotry and prejudice (Ate and 
Akinterinwa, 1990). 
 
The foregoing principles or objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy are the same with that of Balewa 
and succeeding military regimes. The Shagari’s Nigeria foreign policy objectives toward Africa is 
simply a restatement of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust since independence in 1960. 
The Shagari regime during a review of its foreign policy stated that Nigeria has declared that the 
continent of Africa was no longer open to colonization. By its geographical position, size, 
population, economic potentials and resources, Nigeria is left with no option but to play a crucial 
role in the liberation of South Africa. In fact, the decolonization of Mozambique and Angola, 
racism in South Africa and imperialism in Zimbabwe and Namibia, still constitute the most potent 
threats against international peace and security in Southern Africa. For the above reason the Shagri 
administration contributed immensely to the fund of the OAU Liberation Committee, and also 
gave considerable financial assistance on bilateral basis to African Liberation Movements. 
Equally, in keeping with Nigerian dynamic foreign policy and its fervent commitment to the 
freedom of the suffering masses in Southern Africa, the Federal Government sponsored and 
launched the South African Relief Fund (SARF) in Nigeria. The establishment of the fund 
stemmed from the view that West African States cannot be free until the entire continent is 
liberated from the evils of colonialism, apartheid and racism. Since the relief fund was launched, 
donations in cash have been received voluntarily from civil servants in the Federal and State public 
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services, corporations and parastatals, voluntary organizations, businessmen, institutions of 
learning through out the country and other well wishers. More than seven million Naira collected 
by the National Committee on Apartheid and the first consignment of  relief materials consisting 
of blankets, adult boots, children sandals and some large quantities of brown canvas for adults 
have been sent by Nigeria to South Africa as relief under the Shagari administration (Mbachu, 
2011:146-147). 
General Muhammadu Buhari overthrew the Shagari administration in a military coup in 
December, 1983, and became Head of State of Nigeria. To Fawole (2003:138-140), in the 
furtherance of the anti-apartheid objectives, the Buhari government continued to give financial 
assistance to the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) while 
insisting on the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all other jailed anti-apartheid 
activists. The platforms of the OAU, the UN, Commonwealth and the Non aligned Movement 
were effectively utilized in the campaigns to further isolate South Africa. One other significant 
African problem that got prominent attention and nearly caused a split of the OAU was the 
lingering problem in former Western Sahara. In line with its support for African liberation and 
independence, Nigeria suddenly recognized the Saharawi Arab. Democratic Republic (SADR) 
against the objections of Morocco and its supporters. Morocco has laid claim and forcibly held on 
to the territory since the Spanish left the country in 1970s to the chagrin of the OAU and the 
international community, especially after the World Court declaration that Morocco had no rights 
to lay claims to the territory. For Nigeria, therefore, the case of the Western Sahara was a 
straightforward case of self-determination. 
Gambari (1989), Nigeria could not continue to recognize Morocco’s illegal claim to the territory 
in the face of the overwhelming desire of the people for self-determination expressed through their 
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liberation movement, POLISARIO, as well as their declaration in February, 1976 of Western 
Sahara as the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. But it had always been Morocco’s greed and 
arrogance that had prevented genuine independence for the people of Western Sahara. Its 
intransigence had also almost wrecked the OAU because of the split in its ranks over whether to 
support Morocco or SADR. Sensing that Nigeria could no longer continue it’s fence-sitting in the 
face of overwhelming cry for self-determination, the Buhari government decided to rescue the 
OAU from imminent collapse by announcing its recognition of the SADR on November 11,1984 
at the 20th OAU Summit in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Nigeria’s bold action permitted SADR to take 
its seat at the summit. Morocco, feeling humiliated by Nigeria’s action, staged a walkout at the 
summit. The bold and assertive recognition not only won greater recognition and acceptance for 
the SADR and saved the OAU from Morocco’s perpetual blackmail, but it also received great 
endorsement from the generality of Nigerians. 
Generally on the African level, Nigeria recorded impressive performance befitting its acclaimed 
leadership status and in the tradition of previous military regimes. Its accomplishments were 
however most prominent in the West Africa sub-region where the country had always held 
undisputed sway. Nonetheless, it also made some significant impact at the continental level outside 
its immediate geopolitical environment. For example, its continental sway was evident when 
General Babangida was elected Chairman of the OAU for the 1991-92 session, during which 
events of epic proportions took place in African politics. This election, the second time for the 
country in the history of the continental organization, was in recognition of the breadth of Nigeria’s 
reach and the esteem in which it was held by its peers. In the first instance, his dogged commitment 
to the decolonization of Africa led to an intensification of the process of the independence of 
Namibia, Africa’s last colony. Namibia became independent in 1989, crowing Nigeria’s efforts. 
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The regime had no problems implementing Nigeria’s existing principle concerning the question of 
independence for all African States (Fawole, 2003:164). 
In addition, according to Fawole (2003:164 -165) it was in the same Babangida tenure that last 
changes were taking place in South Africa. The racist regime of President Fredrick de Klerk had 
reached the conclusion that apartheid could no longer be continued and he needed a way out of the 
logjam. Nigeria was there to offer a helping hand nudge de Klerk on the path of dismantling the 
evil apartheid system. The efforts led to the unbanning of the African National Congress, the Pan-
Africanist Congress and other liberation movements that had fought apartheid for decades, and the 
release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sizulu, a host of the other freedom fighters jailed by the 
apartheid system. In the process de Klerk was even allowed to visit Nigeria, the first by any South 
African leader. Not only were changes occurring in South Africa, but, also Nigeria was there every 
inch of the way to help the process. While there was a general thaw in the icy relationship, 
diplomatic ties were not established between the two countries. Nigeria waited cautiously until 
irreversible and convincing changes had taken place before such a vital step could be taken. South 
Africa eventually dismantled all the ramparts of apartheid and held the first ever multi-racial 
democratic elections that led to Mandela becoming President of the country in 1994, not long after 
Babangida left office. It was not until then that the first ever exchange of Ambassadors between 
erstwhile moral enemies took place. 
Conclusion 
This paper looks at African liberation and its continued relevance to Nigeria’s foreign policy. It 
sees Nigeria’s commitment towards a strong Afro-centric posture in foreign policy since, she 
gained independence in 1960. Nigeria played a big brother role in the African continent in 
liberating other African countries from colonialism and racism, which is one of the fundamental 
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objectives of her foreign policy. When Nigeria became an independent nation, her founding fathers 
and elites agreed that Nigeria’s independence was incomplete, if other African countries were still 
under colonial rule or governed by the white minority supremacists. Therefore, Nigeria was solidly 
behind and actively supported the liberation struggle in some African countries, such as Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia and the apartheid South Africa. In doing this, 
Nigeria committed both financial and technical assistance. 
In promoting Africa unity and solidarity as well as fostering of economic cooperation, therefore, 
Nigeria played a pivotal role in the coming into being of a continental and sub-regional body, that 
is, the OAU and ECOWAS. These platforms, the OAU and ECOWAS were also effectively 
utilized by Nigeria to further campaign for the liberation of some of the African countries still 
under colonization or dominated by white supremacists. This efforts and commitments made by 
Nigeria resulted to the independence of the above named counties. Again, even after their 
independence, Nigeria gave them financial support. Thus, Nigeria became a key player in 
international affairs and politics. 
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